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New technologies have always been a critical component of 
military strategy and preparedness.  One new technology on the not-too-
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distant technological horizon is lethal autonomous robotics, which would 
consist of robotic weapons capable of exerting lethal force without human 
control or intervention.  There are a number of operational and tactical 
factors that create incentives for the development of such lethal systems as 
the next step in the current development, deployment and use of 
autonomous systems in military forces.  Yet, such robotic systems would 
raise a number of potential operational, policy, ethical and legal issues.  
This article summarizes the current status and incentives for the 
development of lethal autonomous robots, discusses some of the issues 
that would be raised by such systems, and calls for a national and 
international dialogue on appropriate governance of such systems before 
they are deployed.  The article reviews potential modes of governance, 
ranging from ethical principles implemented through modifications or 
refinements of national policies, to changes in the law of war and rules of 
engagement, to international treaties or agreements, or to a variety of other 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Military technology is a field driven by change – the constant pursuit to be better, 
faster, stronger.  Certain technological achievements like guns and planes have happened 
in the purview of the public and have revolutionized the world of war as we know it.  Yet 
many technological changes have occurred under the radar, in military labs and private 
test fields, with the majority of citizens unaware of the leaps and bounds of progress.  
Robotics is one such modern military technology advancement that has largely escaped 
public attention to date.  Combining the most advanced electronic, computer, 
surveillance, and weapons technologies, the robots of today have extraordinary 
capabilities and are quickly changing the landscape of battle and dynamics of war.  One 
of the most important achievements has been the creation of robots with autonomous 
decision-making capability.2
 A variety of never-before-anticipated, complex legal, ethical, and political issues 
have been created – issues in need of prompt attention and action.  There have recently 
been growing calls for the potential risks and impacts of LARs to be considered and 
addressed in an anticipatory and preemptive manner.  For example, in October 2010, a 
United Nations human-rights investigator recommended in a report to the United Nations 
that “[t]he international community urgently needs to address the legal, political, ethical 
and moral implications of the development of lethal robotic technologies.”
  In particular, the development of autonomous robots 
capable of exerting lethal force, known as lethal autonomous robots (“LARs”), has 
significant implications for the military and society.   
3  In 
September 2010, a workshop of experts on unmanned military systems held in Berlin 
issued a statement (supported by a majority but not all of the participants) calling upon 
“the international community to commence a discussion about the pressing dangers that 
these systems pose to peace and international security and to civilians.”4  While there is 
much room for debate about what substantive policies and restrictions (if any) should 
apply to LARs, there is broad agreement that now is the time to discuss those issues.  The 
recent controversy over unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAVs”) that are nevertheless human-
controlled (often referred to as “drones”) demonstrates the importance of anticipating and 
trying to address in a proactive manner the concerns about the next generation of such 
weapons – autonomous, lethal robotics.5
 This article seeks to provide a background of some of these issues and start the 
much needed legal and ethical dialogue related to the use of lethal autonomous robotic 
 
                                                     
2 See generally Ronald C. Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots 
(2009). 
3  Patrick Worsnip, U.N. Official Calls for Study of Ethics, Legality of Unmanned 
Weapons, Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 2010. 
4  The Statement of the 2010 Expert Workshop on Limiting Armed Tele-Operated and 
Autonomous Systems, Berlin, Sept. 22, 2010, available at 
http://www.icrac.co.cc/Expert%20Workshop%20Statement.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2010). 
5  P.W. Singer, Military Robots and the Laws of War, New Atlantis, Winter 2009, at 25, 
43. 
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technologies in the military context.  The next part (Part II) of this article provides a brief 
history and illustrations of autonomous robots in the military, including the pending 
development of LARs.  Part III sets forth a number of important ethical and policy 
considerations regarding the use of robots in military endeavors. Part IV reviews the 
current patchwork of guidelines and policies that apply to the use of military robots.  Part 
V considers the role that international treaties and agreements might play in the 
governance of LARs, while Part VI investigates the potential role of soft-law governance 
mechanisms such as codes of conduct.  
II.  BACKGROUND ON AUTONOMOUS MILITARY ROBOTICS  
 In the United States there has been a long tradition of applying innovative 
technology in the battlefield, which has often translated into military success.6
 
  The 
Department of Defense (“DOD”) naturally extended this approach to robotics.  Primary 
motivators for the use of intelligent robotic or unmanned systems in the battlefield 
include: 
Force multiplication – with robots, fewer soldiers are needed for a given mission, 
and an individual soldier can now do the job of what took many before. 
Expanding the battle-space – robots allow combat to be conducted over larger 
areas than was previously possible. 
Extending the warfighter’s reach – robotics enable an individual soldier to act 
deeper into the battle-space by, for example, seeing farther or striking farther. 
Casualty reduction – robots permit removing soldiers from the most dangerous 
and life-threatening missions. 
 
 The initial generation of military robots generally operate under direct human 
control, such as the “drone” unmanned aerial vehicles being used by the U.S. military for 
unmanned air attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other theaters.7
                                                     
6  Material from this section is derived with permission from Arkin, supra note 2. 
  However, as robotics 
technology continues to advance, a number of factors are pushing many robotic military 
systems toward increased autonomy.  One factor is that as robotic systems perform a 
larger and more central role in military operations, there is a need to have them to 
continue to function just as a human soldier would, if communication channels are 
disrupted.  In addition, as the complexity and speed of these systems increase, it will be 
increasingly limiting and problematic for performance levels to have to interject 
relatively slow human decision-making into the process.  As one commentator recently 
put it, “military systems (including weapons) now on the horizon will be too fast, too 
7  See generally Peter W. Singer, Wired for War (2009); Peter Bergen & Katherine 
Tiedemann, Revenge of the Drones: An Analysis of Drone Strikes in Pakistan, New America 
Foundation, Oct. 19, 2009, available at http://www.newamerica.net/ 
publications/policy/revenge_of_the_drones (last visited Nov. 14, 2010). 
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small, too numerous, and will create an environment too complex for humans to direct.”8
 Based on these trends, many experts believe that autonomous, and in particular 
lethal autonomous, robots are an inevitable and relatively imminent development.
 
9  
Indeed, several military robotic-automation systems already operate at the level where the 
human is still in charge and responsible for the deployment of lethal force, but not in a 
directly supervisory manner.  Examples include: (i) the Phalanx system for Aegis-class 
cruisers in the Navy “capable of autonomously performing its own search, detect, 
evaluation, track, engage and kill assessment functions”10 (Fig. 1); (ii) the MK-60 
encapsulated torpedo (CAPTOR) sea mine system – one of the Navy’s primary anti-
submarine weapons capable of autonomously firing a torpedo and cruise missiles (Fig. 
2); (iii) the Patriot anti-aircraft missile batteries; (iv) “fire and forget” missile systems 
generally; and (v) anti-personnel mines or alternatively other, more discriminating classes 
of mines (e.g., anti-tank).11
                                                     
8  Thomas K. Adams, Future Warfare and the Decline of Human Decisionmaking, 
Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Winter 2001-02, at 57-58. 
  These devices can each be considered to be robotic by some 
definitions, as they all are capable of sensing their environment and actuating, in these 
cases through the application of lethal force. 
9  Arkin, supra note 2, at 7-10; See generally George Bekey, Autonomous Robots: From 
Biological Inspiration to Implementation and Control (2005); Robert Sparrow, Building a Better 
WarBot: Ethical Issues in the Design of Unmanned Systems for Military Applications, 15 Sci. 
Eng. Ethics 169, 173-74 (2009) [hereinafter Sparrow, Building a Better Warbot]. 
10  U.S. Navy, “Phalanx Close-in Weapons Systems,” United States Navy Factfile, 
available at http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=800&ct=2 (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2010). 
11  Antipersonnel mines have been banned by the Ottawa Treaty on antipersonnel mines, 
although the U.S., China, Russia, and thirty-four other nations are currently not party to that 
agreement.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty), Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 
211.  Recent developments, however, indicate that the U.S. is evaluating whether to be a part of 
the Ottawa Treaty. See Mark Landler, White House Is Being Pressed to Reverse Course and Join 
Land Mine Ban, N.Y. Times, May 8, 2010, at A9. 









Figure 2. Tomahawk Cruise Missile on Display (United States Navy Photograph) 
 
 In 2001, Congress issued a mandate that stated that by 2010 one-third of all U.S. 
deep-strike aircraft should be unmanned and by 2015 one-third of all ground vehicles 
should be likewise unmanned.12
                                                     
12  Adams, supra note 8, at 57-58. 
  More recently, the United States Department of Defense 
(“DOD”) issued in December 2007 an Unmanned Systems Roadmap spanning twenty-
five years, reaching until 2032, that likewise anticipated and projected a major shift 
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toward greater reliance on unmanned vehicles in U.S. military operations.13
 As early as the end of World War I, the precursors of autonomous unmanned 
weapons appeared in a project on unpiloted aircraft conducted by the U.S. Navy and the 
Sperry Gyroscope Company.
 
14 Multiple unmanned robotic systems are already being 
developed or are in use that employ lethal force such as the ARV (Armed Robotic 
Vehicle), a component of the Future Combat System (“FCS”); Predator UAVs 
(unmanned aerial vehicles) equipped with hellfire missiles, which have already been used 
in combat but under direct human supervision; and the development of an armed platform 
for use in the Korean Demilitarized Zone, to name a few.15
 The TALON SWORDS platform (Fig. 3) developed by Foster-Miller/QinitiQ has 
already been put to test in Iraq and Afghanistan and is capable of carrying lethal 
weaponry (M240 or M249 machine guns, or a Barrett .50 Caliber rifle). Three of these 
platforms have already served for over a year in Iraq and as of April 2008 and were still 
in the field, contrary to some unfounded rumors.
 
16
 A newer version, referred to as MAARS (Modular Advanced Armed Robotic 
System), is ready to replace the earlier SWORDS platforms in the field.  The newer robot 
can carry a 40mm grenade launcher or an M240B machine gun in addition to various 
non-lethal weapons.  The President of QinitiQ stated the purpose of the robot is to 
“enhance the warfighter’s capability and lethality, extend his situational awareness and 
provide all these capabilities across the spectrum of combat.”





                                                     
13  U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Unmanned Systems Roadmap: 2007-2032 (2007), 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/usroadmap2007.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 
2010). 
14  Adams, supra note 8, at 57. 
15  See Arkin, supra note 2, at 10. 
16  Foster-Miller Inc., Products & Service: TALON Military Robots, EOD, SWORDS, and 
Hazmat Robots (2008), available at http://www.foster-miller.com/lemming.htm (last visited Feb. 
10, 2010). 
17  QinetiQ, Press Release: QinitiQ North America Ships First MAARS Robot, June 5, 
2008, available at http://www.qinetiq.com/home/newsroom/news_releases_homepage/ 
2008/2nd_quarter/qinetiq_north_america0.html (last visited Feb.12, 2010). 




Figure 3. Foster-Miller TALON SWORDS Robot 
(Department of Defense Photograph) 
 
 
 It is interesting to note that soldiers have already surrendered to UAVs even when 
the aircraft has been unarmed. The first documented instance of this occurred during the 
1991 Gulf War. An RQ-2A Pioneer UAV, used for battle damage assessment for shelling 
originating from the U.S.S. Wisconsin, was flying toward Faylaka Island, when several 
Iraqis hoisted makeshift white flags to surrender, thus avoiding another shelling from the 
battleship.18
 The development of autonomous, lethal robotics raises questions regarding if and 
how these systems can conform as well or better than our soldiers with respect to 
adherence to the existing Laws of War.  This is no simple task however.  In the fog of 
war it is hard enough for a human to be able to effectively discriminate whether or not a 
target is legitimate.  Fortunately for a variety of reasons, it may be anticipated, despite the 
current state of the art, that in the future autonomous robots may be able to perform better 
than humans under these conditions, for the following reasons:
  Anecdotally, most UAV units during this conflict experienced variations of 
attempts to surrender to the Pioneer. A logical assumption is that this trend will only 
increase as UAVs’ direct-response ability and firepower increase. 
19
                                                     
18  Rebecca Maksel, Predators and Dragons, Air & Space Magazine, July 1, 2008, 
available at http://www.airspacemag.com/history-of-flight/Predators_and_Dragons.html (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2010). 
 
19  Arkin, supra note 2, at 29-30. 
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• The ability to act conservatively: i.e., they do not need to protect themselves 
in cases of low certainty of target identification.  Autonomous, armed robotic 
vehicles do not need to have self-preservation as a foremost drive, if at all.  
They can be used in a self-sacrificing manner if needed and appropriate 
without reservation by a commanding officer. 
• The eventual development and use of a broad range of robotic sensors better 
equipped for battlefield observations than humans currently possess. 
• They can be designed without emotions that cloud their judgment or result in 
anger and frustration with ongoing battlefield events. In addition, “[f]ear and 
hysteria are always latent in combat, often real, and they press us toward 
fearful measures.”20
• Avoidance of the human, psychological problem of “scenario fulfillment” is 
possible, a factor believed partly contributing to the downing of an Iranian 
Airliner by the U.S.S. Vincennes in 1988.
  Autonomous agents need not suffer similarly. 
21
• Robots can integrate more information from more sources far faster before 
responding with lethal force than a human possibly could in real time. These 
data can arise from multiple remote sensors and intelligence (including 
human) sources, as part of the Army’s network-centric warfare concept and 
the concurrent development of the Global Information Grid.
  This phenomenon leads to 
distortion or neglect of contradictory information in stressful situations, where 
humans use new incoming information in ways that only fit their preexisting 
belief patterns, a form of premature cognitive closure.  Robots can be 
developed so that they are not vulnerable to such patterns of behavior. 
22 “[M]ilitary 
systems (including weapons) now on the horizon will be too fast, too small, 
too numerous and will create environments too complex for humans to 
direct.”23
• When working in a team of combined human soldiers and autonomous 
systems as an organic asset, they have the potential capability of 
independently and objectively monitoring ethical behavior in the battlefield by 
all parties and reporting infractions that might be observed. This presence 
alone might possibly lead to a reduction in human ethical infractions. 
 
 
                                                     
20  Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 251 (4th ed., 1977). 
21  Scott D. Sagan, Rules of Engagement, in Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management 
443, 459-61 (Alexander L. George ed., 1991) 
22  DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), Broad Agency Announcement 
07-52, Scalable Network Monitoring, Strategic Technology Office, Aug. 2007, available at 
.https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab= 
core&id=b524ff8d8f7390061d4c5d5444c9e620&tab=documents&tabmode=list (last visited Sept. 
22, 2010). 
23  Adams, supra note 8, at 58. 
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 The trend is clear: Warfare will continue and autonomous robots will ultimately 
be deployed in the conduct of warfare.  The ethical and policy implications of this 
imminent development are discussed next, followed by a discussion of governance 
options. 
III.  ETHICAL AND POLICY ASPECTS 
 There are numerous ethical, policy, and legal issues relating to creation and 
deployment of lethal autonomous robots.  Although an exhaustive list of these issues will 
not be offered here, a number of the key ones will be outlined.  Rather than defending a 
particular point of view on the technology, the primary aim is to promote awareness of 
these issues and to encourage lawyers, policymakers, and other relevant stakeholders to 
consider what may be appropriate legal and regulatory responses to LARs as they are 
being developed.   
A. Responsibility and Risks 
 Australian philosopher Robert Sparrow has been a prominent voice in debates 
about the ethics of lethal autonomous robots.  For instance, he examines the complexities 
associated with assigning ethical and legal responsibility to someone, or something, if an 
autonomous robot commits a war crime.24  He considers several possible solutions to this 
puzzle, including “the programmer,” “the commanding officer,” and “the machine” itself, 
but concludes that each option has its profound share of difficulties.25  Remaining neutral 
on whether Sparrow is correct, assigning responsibility to a LAR’s behavior (or 
misbehavior) is an important matter that warrants further investigation.  Along related 
lines, Peter Asaro doubts whether a robot can be punished in a meaningful way since it is 
unlikely to possess any form of moral agency, observing that traditional notions from 
criminal law such as “rehabilitation” and “deterrence” do not seem applicable here.26
 One of the principal justifications for relying on autonomous robots is that they 
would have access to a greater amount of information than any human soldier.  Yet this 
advantage raises key questions, including whether a robot should ever be permitted to 
refuse an order and, if so, under what conditions. Refusing an order on the battlefield is 
of course a serious matter, but should a robot be given more latitude to do so than a 
human soldier?   
  
 Battlefield units containing human soldiers and LARs will raise additional ethical 
issues relating to risk and responsibility.  According to Sparrow, “human beings will start 
                                                     
24  Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 J. Applied Phil. 66 (2007) [hereinafter Sparrow, Killer 
Robots]. 
25  Id. at 69-73. 
26 Peter Asaro, Robots and Responsibility from a Legal Perspective, Proceedings of the 
IEEE 2007 International Conference on Robotics and Automation, Workshop on RoboEthics, 
April 14, 2007, Rome, Italy. 
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to be placed in harm’s way as a result of the operations of robots.”27  But will soldiers 
genuinely be aware of the kinds of risks they are being exposed to when working with 
robotic counterparts?  If not, Sparrow fears that soldiers might place too much trust in a 
machine, assuming, for example, it has completed its assigned tasks.28
B. Legal Status of Civilians 
  And even if 
soldiers are fully aware of the risks associated with reliance on robotics, how much 
additional risk exposure is justifiable?     
 In any treatment of LARs, the question of potential liability to civilians must be 
considered.  Civilians initially responsible for empowering or placement of LARs may 
not necessarily be absolved of legal responsibility should the LAR perform unintended 
consequences.  For example, it is entirely possible that a failure to recognize and obey an 
attempt for surrender could invoke a violation of the Law of Armed Conflict (“LOAC”).  
If a civilian software writer failed to initially write code that recognized the right to 
surrender through a flag of truce or other means, then a “reach back” to civilian liability 
for the breach might be possible.  Likewise, if the civilian software writer failed in 
attempts to program identifiable legally protected structures such as places of worship, 
hospitals, or civilian schools, the code writer may be subject to potential liability in those 
scenarios as well.   
 The use of smaller yet lethal robots is gaining acceptance in battlefield operations.  
It is entirely possible that a small three-foot or less autonomous robot might be thrown or 
“launched” into an open building or window with lethal gun-firing capabilities much like 
a whirling dervish.29
 Similarly, well-intentioned and seemingly complete software programming might 
go astray in other ways.  Under Law of War concepts, and specifically the Hague 
Convention (Hague VIII), it is forbidden to lay unanchored automatic contact mines 
unless they will become harmless at one hour or less after the mines are no longer under 
  Should this whirling dervish either not be programmed to accept, or 
fail to recognize, internationally established symbols of surrender such as a white flag, 
would the robot’s responsible forces, probably including civilian software code writers,  
escape legal liability for these omissions?   
                                                     
27  Sparrow, Building a Better WarBot, supra note 9, at 172. 
28  Id. at 172-73. 
29  For example, the TALON robot has been cited by its manufacturer for its extensive use 
in military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  It is small and is capable of a variety of uses 
including the ability to deliver weapons fire.  The manufacturer’s web site specifically states that 
“TALON’s multi-mission family of robots includes one specifically equipped for tactical 
scenarios frequently encountered by police SWAT units and MPs in all branches of the military. 
TALON SWAT/MP is a tactical robot that can be configured with a loudspeaker and audio 
receiver, night vision and thermal cameras and a choice of weapons for a lethal or less-than-lethal 
response”. Qinetiq, TALON Robots – TALON SWAT/MP, available at http://www.qinetiq-
na.com/Collateral/Documents/English-US/QDS09-049-TALON-SWAT-MP.pdf (last visited Feb. 
28, 2010). 
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the control of the person (nation) who laid them.30
 Consider the situation described by P.W. Singer in “Wired for War” in which a 
robot programmed to perform sentry work failed to identify a threatening action.
  If one examines unmanned vehicles, 
particularly unmanned under-water sea vehicles launched from a manned “mother ship,” 
in the event that the mother ship becomes lost or disabled the unmanned “robotic” ship 
vehicle must, consistent with international navigational regulations and protocols, be able 
on its own to comply with the navigational regulations and responsibilities.  No matter 
the degree of robotic autonomy, a legal responsibility is likely to exist for the actions of 
the un-tethered “loose” unmanned vehicle.      
31
 The above examples illustrate how seemingly complete autonomous robotic 
systems may still pose legal liability issues upon the civilians initially responsible for 
their use within battle space operations.  Amidst these scenarios, the civilian software 
code writer’s work and ultimate responsibilities may enjoy a much longer and 
unanticipated legal life.     
  In 
that scenario in which a bar patron suffers from the hiccups, a robot trained to act as a 
sentry with accompanying lethal force could reasonably fail to identify the well-
intentioned furtive hand gun gesture of the bartender so that the patron might be scared so 
as to lose the hiccups.  If the robot sentry failed to identify this mimicked handgun 
gesture and mistakenly shot the bartender “thinking” a lethal threat existed, it is 
conceivable that the software writer of the code might be responsible for the mistaken 
actions.   
C. Complexity and Unpredictability 
 Unfortunately, a full awareness of the risks from autonomous robots may be 
impossible.  Wallach and Allen discuss how predicting the relevant dangers can be 
fraught with uncertainty.32  For example, a semi-autonomous anti-aircraft gun 
accidentally killed several South African soldiers.33
                                                     
30  The Law of War in conjunction with the laying of contact underwater mines is covered 
in Article I to the Hague Convention VIII; October 18, 1907.  Article I states:  “It is forbidden [] 
[t]o lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are so constructed as to become 
harmless one hour at most after the person who laid them ceases to control them; [t]o lay 
anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they have broken 
loose from their moorings; [and] [t]o use torpedoes which do not become harmless when they 
have missed their mark.”  Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine 
Contact Mines, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 U.S.T. 541. 
  Roger Clarke pointed out years ago 
that, “[c]omplex systems are prone to component failures and malfunctions, and to 
31  Singer, supra note 7, at 81. 
32  Wendell Wallach & Colin Allen, Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong 
189-214 (2009).  
33  Noah Shachtman, Robot Cannon Kills 9, Wounds 14, Wired.com, Oct. 18, 2007, 
available at http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/10/robot-cannon-ki.html (last visited Feb. 8, 
2010). 
Vol. XII The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2011  
284  
intermodule inconsistencies and misunderstandings.”34  Blay Whitby echoes the notion 
by arguing that computer programs often do not behave as predictably as software 
programmers would hope.35
 Perhaps robot ethics has not received the attention it needs, given a common 
misconception that robots will do only what we have programmed them to do.  
Unfortunately, such a belief is sorely outdated, harking back to a time when computers 
were simpler and their programs could be written and understood by a single person.  
Now, programs with millions of lines of code are written by teams of programmers, none 
of whom knows the entire program; hence, no individual can predict the effect of a given 
command with absolute certainty, since portions of large programs may interact in 
unexpected, untested ways.  Even straightforward, simple rules such as Asimov’s Laws 
of Robotics can create unexpected dilemmas.
  Experts from computing, robotics, and other relevant 
communities need to continue weighing in on the matter so the reliability of LARs can be 
more thoroughly assessed. 
36  Furthermore, increasing complexity may 
lead to emergent behaviors, i.e., behaviors not programmed but arising out of sheer 
complexity.37
Related major research efforts also are being devoted to enabling robots to learn 
from experience.  Learning may enable the robot to respond to novel situations, an 
apparent blessing given the impracticality and impossibility of predicting all eventualities 
on the designer’s part.  But this capability raises the question of whether it can be 
predicted with reasonable certainty what the robot will learn.  Arguably, if a robot’s 
behavior could be adequately predicted, the robot would just be programmed to behave in 
certain ways in the first place instead of requiring learning.  Thus, unpredictability in the 
behavior of complex robots is a major source of worry, especially if robots are to operate 
in unstructured environments, rather than the carefully-structured domain of a factory or 
test laboratory. 
 
D.  Just-War Theory 
 An overarching concern is whether the use of LARs is consistent with time-
honored principles, rules, and codes that guide military operations, including just-war 
theory, the Law of Armed Conflict (“LOAC”), and the Rules of Engagement.  Scholars 
are already starting to analyze whether LARs will be capable of fulfilling the 
requirements of just-war theory.  Noel Sharkey, for example, doubts that robots will be 
                                                     
34  Roger Clarke, Asimov's Laws of Robotics: Implications for Information Technology-Part 
II, 27 Computer 57, 65 (1994). 
35  Blay Whitby, Computing Machinery and Morality, 22 AI & Society 551, 551-563 
(2008). 
36  Issac Asimov, I, Robot (1950). 
37  See, e.g., Ray Kurzweil. The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed 
Human Intelligence (1999); Ray Kurzweil. The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend 
Biology (2005). 
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capable of upholding the principle of discrimination, which involves being able to 
distinguish between combatants and non-legitimate targets such as civilians and 
surrendering soldiers.38  While discussing military robots and the principle of 
proportionality, Sparrow argues that “decisions about what constitutes a level of force 
proportionate to the threat posed by enemy forces are extremely complex and context 
dependent and it is seemingly unlikely that machines will be able to make these decisions 
reliably for the foreseeable future.”39
 Further, Asaro examines whether military robots may actually encourage wars by 
altering pre-conflict proportionality calculations and last resort efforts.
  However, at this point, it remains an open question 
whether the differences between LARs and existing military technology are significant 
enough to bar the former’s use.   
40  A fundamental 
impediment to war is the loss of human life, especially the lives of fellow citizens; 
casualties are a significant reason why wars are not more common.  Sending an army of 
machines to war—rather than friends and relatives—may not exact the same physical and 
emotional toll on a population.41
 Finally, Singer suggests that these LARs weapons could undermine 
counterinsurgency efforts, where indigenous respect and trust is crucial to creating a 
reasonable chance of success.
  Assuming the existence of a just cause, one could 
celebrate this new calculus, which more readily permits legitimate self-defense.  
However, this reduced cost may, in turn, reduce the rigor with which non-violent 
alternatives are pursued and thus encourage unnecessary—and therefore unjust—wars.  
While this possible moral hazard obviously does not require us to maximize war costs, it 
does require efforts to inform and monitor national security decision-makers.     
42
E.  Civilian Applications   
  Unmanned weapons may be perceived as indicative of 
flawed characters and/or tepid commitments, and are incapable of developing necessary 
personal relationships with local citizens.  And even if remote controlled or autonomous 
weapons are more discriminate than soldiers, they are commonly perceived as less so.     
 Technology developed for military purposes frequently has civilian applications 
and vice versa.  For instance, Singer notes how the REMUS, the Remote Environmental 
                                                     
38  Noel Sharkey, Cassandra or False Prophet of Doom: AI Robots and War, 23(4) IEEE 
Intelligent Systems 14, 16-17 (2008); Noel Sharkey, The Ethical Frontiers of Robotics, 32 
Science 1800, 1800-01 (2008) (“[N]o computational system can discriminate between combatants 
and innocents in a close-contact encounter”).  
39  Sparrow, Building a Better WarBot, supra note 9, at 178. 
40  Peter Asaro, How Just Could a Robot War Be?, in Adam Briggle, Katinka Waelbers, and 
Philip Brey (eds.), Current Issues in Computing and Philosophy  1, 7-9 (2008). 
41  Robert Sparrow, Predators or Plowshares? Arms Control of Robotic Weapons, IEEE 
Tech. Soc’y Magazine, Spring 2009, at 25, 26 (hereinafter “Sparrow, Predators or 
Plowshares?”). 
42  Singer, supra note 7, at 299. 
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Monitoring Unit, was originally used by oceanographers but later an altered version of it 
was deployed in Iraq.43  Further, many federal and state agencies have sought permission 
to use military technology such as UAVs.44  Consequently, once LARs are developed for 
military use, what might the implications be down the road for their use in civilian 
contexts?45
F.  Broader Ethical and Social Considerations 
 
 Any decisions and policies regarding military development and use of LARs will 
impact, and be impacted by, broader technological and social considerations.46
 Consider first what an LAR actually is: one of many potential functions 
platformed on a generic technology base, which itself may be highly variable.  Thus, a 
“lethal” function, such as a repeating kinetic weapon mounted on a robotic system, is one 
that is intentionally programmed to identify, verify, and eliminate a human target.  At 
other times, the same basic robotic system might be fitted for cargo carrying capacity, for 
surveillance, or for many other functions, either in a military or a civil capacity.  
“Autonomous” means that the platform is capable of making the necessary decisions on 
its own, without intervention from a human.  This, again, may involve the lethality 
function, or it may not: one might, for example, tell a cargo robot to find the best way to a 
particular destination, and simply let it go.
  The 
failure to acknowledge these considerations upfront, and include them in the analysis, can 
lead to dysfunctional results, and unnecessary failure of legal and policy initiatives.  
Accordingly, we will highlight some relevant considerations, and their potential 
implications. 
47
 Similarly, “robot” may sound obvious, but it is not.  Tracked machines such as the 
Talon or PackBot, or UAVs such as the Predator or Raven, are fairly obvious robotic 
technologies, but what about “smart” land mines that are inert until they sense the proper 
    
                                                     
43  Id. at 37-38. 
44  Anne Broache, Police Agencies Push for Drone Sky Patrols, CNET News, Aug. 9, 2007, 
available at http://news.cnet.com/Police-agencies-push-for-drone-sky-patrols/2100-11397_3-
6201789.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010). 
45  See generally Gary Marchant and Lyn Gulley,  National Security Neuroscience and the 
Reverse Dual-Use Dilemma, 1 Am. J. Bioethics Neuroscience 20, 20-22 (2010). 
46  This consideration led the Lincoln Center for Applied Ethics at Arizona State University, 
the Inamori International Center for Ethics and Excellence at Case Western Reserve University, 
and the U.S. Naval Academy Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership to found the Consortium 
for Emerging Technology, Military Operations, and National Security, or CETMONS.  See 
CETMONS, http://cetmons.org (last visited June 17, 2010).  See generally also Max Boot, War 
Made New (2006); John Keegan, A History of Warfare (1993). 
47  See, e.g., DARPA, http://www.darpa.mil/grandchallenge/index.asp (last visited June 17, 
2010), detailing the progress in autonomous vehicles as a result of DARPA’s Grand Challenge 
initiative. 
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triggering conditions and are capable of jumping, or exploding, or doing whatever else 
they are built to do?48  What about bombs that, once deployed, glide above the battlefield 
until finding an enemy target, which are then attacked while sparing cars, buses, and 
homes?49  And what about a grid of surveillance/attack cybersects (insect size robots or 
cyborgs consisting of biological insects with robotic functions integrated into them)?  
Each cybersect taken alone may be too insignificant and dumb to be considered a robot, 
but the cybersect grid as a whole may actually be quite intelligent.50  Going one step 
further, what should we call a weapons platform that is wirelessly connected directly into 
a remote human brain (in recent experiments, a monkey at Duke University with a chip 
implanted in its brain that wirelessly connected it to a robot in Japan kept the Japanese 
robot running by thought, so that the robot was in essence an extension of its own 
physicality)?51  Even now, the Aegis computer fire control system deployed on Navy 
vessels comes with four settings: “semiautomatic”, where humans retain control over the 
firing decision; “automatic special,” where humans set the priorities but Aegis determines 
how to carry the priorities out; “automatic,” where humans are kept in the loop but the 
system works without their input; and “casualty” where the system does what it thinks 
necessary to save the ship.52
  This brief digression raises serious questions about what an LAR actually is.  
Certainly, it has a technology component, but in some ways this is almost trivial 
compared to its social, political, ethical, and cultural dimensions.  In fact, one might well 
argue that in many important ways a LAR is more of a cultural construct than a 




                                                     
48 See, e.g., Dynamic Networking and Smart Sensing Enable Next-Generation Landmines, 
http://www.computer.org/portal/web/csdl/doi/10.1109/MPRV.2004.4 (last visited June 17, 2010). 
  This is an important point, for it suggests that any legal or regulatory approach 
that focuses on technology may be misplaced; conversely, it means that the underlying 
technologies which come together in an LAR will continue to evolve independent or 
irrespective of any direct controls on LARs – including the functionality of the physical 
hardware, the sophistication of the software, and the integrated technological capability 
49  See, e.g., The Calibration of Destruction, The Economist, Jan. 30, 2010, at 87, 87-88. 
50 Gary Kitchener, Pentagon Plans Cyber-Insect Army, BBC News, Mar. 16, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4808342.stm, last visited June 17, 2010. 
51 See, e.g., K. C. Jones, Monkey Brains in U. S. Make Robot Walk in Japan, 
InformationWeek, Jan. 16, 2008, available at 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/personal_tech/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=205801020, 
last visited June 18, 2010. 
52  See, e.g., Singer, supra note 7, at 124-25.   
53  Similarly, commercial jets were understood to be transportation technologies until 
reconceptualized by Al-Qaeda terrorists into a weapon.  Many individuals, not just engineers, 
underestimate the social and cultural dimensions of technology.  See, e.g., Wiebe Bijker, Thomas 
P. Hughes & Trevor Pinch (eds.), The Social Construction of Technological Systems (1997). 
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we call “autonomy.”   
 It is because the technologies are separate from the use that the discussion of 
LARs is frequently confused: LARs are often discussed as if they were a “military 
technology,” when in fact they are a set of technologies that can be integrated in ways 
that are effective and desirable given current military conditions.  Let us begin by 
identifying two levels at which technologies function: Level I, or the shop floor level; and 
Level II, or the institutional and social system level.54
 To return to LARs, then, one might begin by asking why deploy such a 
technology in any form?  Here, one has serious coupling between Level I and Level II 
issues.  The immediate Level I response is that deployment of LARs would save soldiers’ 
lives on the side that deployed them; many explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan that 
might otherwise have killed and maimed soldiers have been identified, and eliminated, by 
robots.  But this is in some ways only begging a serious Level II question.  In World War 
I, for example, generals thought little of killing 100,000 men at a go by sending them into 
the teeth of concentrated machine gun fire.  Consequently, simply avoiding casualties is 
an inadequate explanation.  That world, however, has changed, especially for the U.S. 
military, which faces a particularly stark dilemma.  It is charged by its citizens with being 
able to project force anywhere around the world, under virtually any conditions.  But, for 
a number of reasons, American civilians have become increasingly averse to any 
casualties.  So the U. S. military finds itself in the dilemma of being required to project its 
power without American soldiers dying.  Additionally, the long-term demographics are 
not good: Americans, like other developed countries, are looking at an aging 
demographic, with the immediate implication that there are fewer young people to fill 
boots on the ground.
  Thus, for example, if one gives a 
vaccine to a child to prevent her from getting a particular disease, one is dealing with a 
Level I technology system: the desired goal, no disease, is inherent in use of the 
technology.  On the other hand, if one starts a vaccine program in a developing country in 
order to encourage economic growth because of better health, it is a Level II system: use 
of vaccines may contribute to such a goal, but there are many intervening systems, 
pressures, policies, and institutions.   
55
 The institutional and social context of military operations for the United States is 
increasingly one where better military productivity becomes paramount, with 
productivity measured as mission accomplishment per soldier lost.  And robots can 
potentially contribute significantly to achieving such productivity.  It’s not just about 
saving soldier’s lives, a Level I technology.  It’s also about building the capability to 
continue to project power with fewer casualties, and to do so because culture and society 
are changing to make fatalities, whether soldier or civilian, less acceptable, which are 
Level II trends. 
 
                                                     
54  The analysis of technology systems also includes Level III, the earth systems level; see 
Braden R. Allenby, Earth Systems Engineering and Management:  A Manifesto, 41 Envtl. Sci. & 
Tech. 7960, 7960-66 (2007). 
55  See Noel Shachtman, Army Looks to Keep Troops Forever Young, Wired Danger Room, 
Apr. 24, 2009, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/04/army-looks-to-keep-troops-forever-
young/ (last visited April 26, 2009).  
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 In sum, LARs raise a broad range of complex ethical and social issues, which we 
have only begun to address here.  Suffice it to say, though, that any attempt to regulate or 
govern such technology systems must address these issues in addition to the more 
concrete technological and legal issues.  The various models available to attempt this task 
are discussed in the following sections.      
IV.  EXISTING GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS FOR MILITARY ROBOTS 
 At present, there are no laws or treaties specifically pertaining to restrictions or 
governance of military robots, unmanned platforms, or other technologies currently under 
consideration within the purview of this article.  Instead, aspects of these new military 
technologies are covered piecemeal (if at all) by a patchwork of legislation pertaining to 
projection of force under international law; treaties or conventions pertaining to specific 
technologies and practices; international humanitarian law; and interpretations of existing 
principles of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).56
 There are, for example, multiple conventions in international law which purport to 
deal with specific technologies and practices, such as agreements pertaining to biological 
weapons,
 
57 chemical weapons,58 certain types of ammunition,59 the hostile use of 
environmental modification,60 land mines,61 incendiary weapons,62
                                                     
56 See generally Stephen E. White, Brave New World: Neurowarfare and the Limits of 
International Humanitarian Law, 41 Cornell Int’l L.J. 177 (2008); Mark Edward Peterson, The 
UAV and the Current and Future Regulatory Construct for Integration into the National Airspace 
System, 71 J. Air L. & Com. 521 (2006); Geoffrey S. Corn, Unarmed but How Dangerous? 
Civilian Augmentees, the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Search for a More Effective Test for 
Permissible Civilian Battlefield Functions, 2 J. Nat’l Sec. L.& Pol’y 257 (2008); Andrew H. 
Henderson, Murky Waters: The Legal Status of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles, 53 Naval L. Rev. 
55 (2006); Jason Borenstein, The Ethics of Autonomous Military Robots, 2 Studies in Ethics, Law 
& Tech. Issue 1, Article 2 (2008);  John J. Klein, The Problematic Nexus: Where Unmanned 
Combat Air Vehicles and the Law of Armed Conflict Meet, Air & Space Power J., Chronicles 
Online J. (2003), available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/klein.html 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2010); Anthony J. Lazarski, Legal Implications of the Uninhabited Combat 
Aerial Vehicle—Focus: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 16 Aerospace Power J. 74 (2002). 
 blinding laser 
57 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and or their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 
U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163. 
58 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45. 
59 The 1999 Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899, 1. Am. J. 
Int'l L. 157-59 (Supp.). 
60 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151. 
61 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
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weapons,63 and numerous others.64
 In the interim, it bears mention that there are a variety of other potential existing 
constraints found in military doctrines, professional ethical codes, and public “watch-
dog” activities (as well as in international law) that might pertain to the present 
governance dilemma regarding military robotics. These constraints, generally, were 
created to address a variety of issues which are not wholly consistent with or applicable 
to the challenges created by the development and use of robots for military and security 
purposes. Yet, their existence does provide an architecture upon which to build a system 
of governance regarding the military use of robots on the battlefield. 
  The United States is not a party to all of these 
conventions, and to the extent their requirements do not rise to the level of customary 
international law, the United States is not specifically bound by them. On the other hand, 
the United States has taken considerable interest in the articulation of standards which 
purport to regulate conduct generally on the battlefield, including how weapons are used.  
Thus, while no international agreements specifically regulate the use of LARs today, it is 
possible that such agreements might be negotiated and implemented in the future, as 
discussed later in this article. 
As we contemplate employing this existing architecture toward the governance of 
military robotics, it bears noting that governance systems that are successful in obtaining 
compliance with a particular policy, rule, or directive share a number of important 
characteristics.  Successful systems of “good governance” involve clearly defined and 
articulated expectations:  that is, they identify the precise problems to be solved, changes 
to be made, or goals to be sought through governance in straightforward terms. The 
solutions proposed to these problems, moreover, are realistic:  that is, they do not attempt 
to articulate ideal norms of what ought to be, but rather provide feasible norms describing 
what can, in fact, be accomplished, under existing political, cultural and legal constraints.  
Successful systems of governance, moreover, are holistic and inclusive, in the sense that 
all stakeholders are identified and involved in some fashion in making the rules.  Finally, 
they issue rules or principles that are subject to assessment:  that is, the results are 
capable of measurement and evaluation of effectiveness, in a manner that allows for 
                                                                                                                                                              
Devices (Protocol II), Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects, May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 133; Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 
Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211. 
62 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 
1342 U.N.T.S. 171. 
63 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 13, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1218. 
64 See generally International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian 
Law - Treaties & Documents, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/TOPICS?OpenView (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2009). 
Vol. XII The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2011  
291  
subsequent amendment and improvement of the requirements when appropriate.65
If these principles of good governance are not adhered to, expectations and 
pronouncements often go unheeded. In light of these canons of best practice for good 
governance, we argue that the goal of technological innovation governance should be to 
insure that all technological innovation is accomplished within the framework of a culture 
that respects the long-term effects of such work, while considering, insofar as possible, 
the likely ramifications of the proposed innovation and development.  Appropriate 
governance should also insure that future end-users or consumers of the specified 
technological innovations are aware of those ramifications, ideally in the design phase, 
but at very least well before development or application of the innovations in question.  
All this should be accomplished, moreover, without placing too heavy of a legislative 
hand on, nor otherwise discouraging, the creative and competitive energies that generate 
much-needed innovation. 
  
Measured against the foregoing standards, contemporary governance architecture 
regarding the innovation and use of military robots would appear wholly inadequate to 
the task. And yet, there is considerable professional, national and international 
infrastructure upon which to hang a regime of articulated goals and proscriptions. 
At the professional level, for example, there are multiple codes for ethical 
guidance regarding both best practices and limits on acceptable professional practice for a 
wide range of academic and professional disciplines.  These ethical codes might 
conceivably find themselves applied in innovation in the field of robotics, especially for 
participants from professions such as engineering, computer science, biology, medicine, 
law, and psychology.  As a general rule, these ethical codes or guidelines for professional 
practice are grounded in the traditional responsibilities of their individual professions, 
and do not contemplate the challenges which can be said to presently exist for innovation 
generally, or within the field of robotics specifically.  Professions, for example, are often 
regulated at the state level based upon varying degrees of oversight by private 
organizations and societies. Those codes speak primarily to issues of the professional’s 
relationship and responsibilities toward clients and customers, as well as toward likely 
competitors; they likewise address important moral and legal issues such as privacy, 
intellectual property, and education, but often lack any concrete obligations relating to 
broader social responsibilities for technology development.66
                                                     
65  There has been a good deal of discussion in recent years about the subject of good 
governance, especially in the development area. The United Nations, for example, lists eight 
characteristics of good governance, which are: consensus oriented, participatory, adherence to the 
rule of law, effect and efficient, accountable, transparent, responsive, equitable and inclusive. 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, What is Good 
Governance?, United Nations, 2009, available at 
http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 
2010). See also Sam Agere, Good Governance, Promotion of Good Governance Principles, 
Practices and Perspectives (2000). 
   
66  A general review of various professional codes of ethics reveals a paucity of information 
which might be considered relevant to innovators of new technologies and practices. The 
American Psychological Association Code of Ethics is intended to protect “the welfare and 
protection of the individuals and groups with whom psychologists work” and to “improve the 
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Some of these internal ethical codes also appear to contemplate the future 
contexts in which professionals will have to operate.  For example, a “Pledge of Ethical 
Conduct” printed in the commencement program for the College of Engineering at the 
University of California, Berkley in May 1998, reads: 
 
I promise to work for a BETTER WORLD where science and technology 
are used in socially responsible ways. I will not use my EDUCATION for 
any purpose intended to harm human beings or the environment. 
Throughout my career, I will consider the ETHICAL implications of my 
work before I take ACTION. While the demands placed upon me may be 
great, I sign this declaration because I recognize that INDIVIDUAL 
RESPONSIBILITY is the first step on the path to PEACE.67
 
 
To date, the most relevant initiative relating to the ethics of military technologies 
such as robotics is a “Code of Ethics” for robots being proposed by the Republic of South 
Korea (although the terms of the Code have yet to be fleshed out).68
                                                                                                                                                              
condition of individuals, organizations, and society.”  American Psychological Association, 
Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, 2010 Amendments, Preamble, available 
at http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).  Psychologists are 
instructed to “strive to benefit those with whom they work and take care to do no harm,” although 
this is stated as a general principle that is aspirational and non-enforceable.  Id., Principle A. The 
American Medical Association provides nine principles which “…define the essentials of 
honorable behavior for the physician.” American Medical Association, AMA Code of Medical 
Ethics, Principles of Medical Ethics (2001), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/principles-medical-
ethics.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).  Interestingly, the principles do not contain the traditional 
do no harm proscription but do require the provision of competent medical care “…with 
compassion and respect for human dignity and rights.” Id., Principle I. In most cases, except 
emergencies, physicians retain the right to “…choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, 
and the environment in which to provide medical care.”  Id., Principle VI.  The American Society 
of Civil Engineers requires engineers to “…hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the 
public” and to “…strive to comply with the principles of sustainable development in the 
performance of their professional duties.” American Society of Civil Engineers, Code of Ethics, 
available at http://www.asce.org/inside/inside/codeofethics.cfm, (last visited Nov. 24, 2009).  A 
private professional association, the Information Systems Audit and Control Association 
(ISACA), which purports to serve ‘IT governance professionals’ requires their members to 
“…support the implementation of, and encourage compliance with, appropriate standards, 
procedures and controls for information systems.” Information Systems Audit and Control 
Association, ISACA Code of Professional Ethics, available at 
http://www.isaca.org/Certification/Code-of-Professional-Ethics/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2009).  
  The main focus of 
67  University of California, Berkley, Pledge of Ethical Conduct (1998), available at 
http://courses.cs.vt.edu/cs3604/lib/WorldCodes/Pledge.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
68  Republic of Korea, Ministry of Information and Communication quoted in Stefan 
Lovgren, Robot Code of Ethics to Prevent Android Abuse, Protect Humans, National Geographic 
News, Mar. 16, 2007, available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/03/070316-
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the charter appears to deal with social problems, such as human control over robots and 
humans becoming addicted to robot interaction (e.g., using robots as sex toys).69 The 
document will purportedly deal with legal issues, such as the protection of data acquired 
by robots and establishing clear identification and traceability of the machines.70
These internal professional codes and norms are complemented by a host of non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”) which contribute to the transparency of innovation 
programs, especially those performed on behalf of the State. The goals and agendas of 
these organizations are as varied as their names, but their methodologies generally help to 
educate the end-user or consumer about what is being developed and what the future may 
portend.  Such NGOs often succeed in establishing a record of evidence and impact 
regarding a particular thread of innovation, placing this evidence before the public and 
state funders (legislatures, policy-makers, and appropriate government agencies), and 
providing news media with the expertise to report on the likely ramifications of proposed 
technological innovations.
  
71  An NGO specifically focused on promoting arms control for 
military robots has recently been formed, called the International Committee for Robot 
Arms Control (“ICRAC”).72
At the national level in the United States, existing governance can be described as 
decentralized, and in one sense, reactionary. It reflects the push and pull of multiple 
constituencies and philosophies regarding the efficacy of support for technological 
innovation. U.S. federal law and regulation reflect the belief that innovation is best 
encouraged on the one hand by vigorous and unrestrained marketplace competition,
 
73
                                                                                                                                                              
robot-ethics.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
 
69  Id. 
70  Id. 
71  An example is the International POPs Elimination Network (IPEN), “a unique global 
network of people and public interest organizations” that “share a common commitment to 
achieve a toxic-free future.”   Welcome to the International POPs Elimination Network, 
International POPs Elimination Network, available at  http://www.ipen.org/ (last visited Oct. 4, 
2010).  IPEN is composed of over 700 public interest health and environmental organizations 
from more than 80 countries which describes itself as a “global network of more than 700 public 
non-governmental organizations working together in over 80 countries. Added to these groups is 
the literature which has come out of think tanks and academic institutions which speaks to the 
intersection of ethics and technological innovation. 
72  International Committee for Robot Arms Control, available at http://www.icrac.co.uk/ 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2010). 
73  The President’s Council on Bioethics recognized this fact in its Report on the state of 
biotechnology in 2003: “Whether one likes it or not, progress in biology and biotechnology is 
now intimately bound up with industry and commerce….Whatever one finally thinks about the 
relative virtues and vices of contemporary capitalism, it is a fact that progress in science and 
technology owes much to free enterprise. The possibility of gain adds the fuel of interest to the 
fire of genius, and even as the profits accrue only to some, the benefits are, at least in principle, 
available to all. And the competition to succeed provides enormous incentives to innovations, 
growth, and progress. We have every reason to expect exponential increases in biotechnologies, 
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while recognizing, on the other hand, the need for the government to organize federal 
funding, encourage innovation, and regulate the more egregious results of 
commercialization.74
 
  Within the U.S., for example, there appears to be no urgency 
regarding the coordination of governance of emerging technologies such as robotics 
within the federal government generally; nor is there any evidence of a prevailing belief 
that the present governance architecture requires any type of thorough overhaul to 
respond to the challenges of the 21st century. Indeed the President’s Council of Advisors 
on Science and Technology, in its report of April 2008 on nanotechnology, concluded: 
[T]here are no ethical concerns that are unique to nanotechnology today. 
That is not to say that nanotechnology does not warrant careful ethical 
evaluation. As with all new science and technology development, all 
stakeholders have a shared responsibility to carefully evaluate the ethical, 
legal, and societal implications raised by novel science and technology 
developments. However, the[re is] … no apparent need at this time to 
reinvent fundamental ethical principles or fields, or to develop novel 
approaches to assessing societal impacts with respect to nanotechnology.75
 
 
Turning to military uses of robotics, specifically, the development and use of 
robots for military purposes continues to be constrained, as mentioned above, by various 
restrictions regarding the projection of force found in international law that are translated 
into national laws and regulations. There are, as cited above, multiple conventions which 
purport to deal with specific technologies and practices.  Even though the United States is 
not a party to all of these conventions, nor necessarily bound by all of them, it is 
nonetheless the case that the U. S. has taken considerable interest in the articulation of 
standards which purport to regulate conduct generally on the battlefield, including how 
weapons are used.  
 There are five principles which run through the language of the various 
humanitarian law treaties76
                                                                                                                                                              
and, therefore, in their potential uses in all aspect of human life.” The President’s Council on 




 (the rules) which the United States acknowledges and 
74  See, e.g., Harris-Kefauver Act, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962)  (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1998)) (commonly referred to as the 1962 Drug 
Amendments); National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974); 21st 
Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act, Pub. L. No. 108-153, 117 Stat. 1923 
(2003). 
75  President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, National Nanotechnology 
Initiative: Second Assessment and Recommendations of the NNAP (2008), available at 
http://www.nano.gov/PCAST_NNAP_NNI_Assessment_2008.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) 
(emphasis added). 
76  Humanitarian law is that international law comprised of a set of rules which seek to limit 
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generally honors regarding the conduct of warfare. These are: (i) a general prohibition on 
the employment of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering, (ii) military necessity, (iii) proportionality, (iv) discrimination, and (iv) 
command responsibility.  These principles, as discussed below, impose ethical and 
arguably legal restraints on at least some uses of lethal autonomous robots. 
First, some weapons, it is argued, are patently inhumane, no matter how they are 
used or what the intent of the user is. This principle has been recognized since at least 
1907,77 although consensus over what weapons fall within this category tends to change 
over time.  The concept here is that some weapons are design-dependent:  that is, their 
effects are reasonably foreseeable even as they leave the laboratory. In 1996, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross at Montreux articulated a test to determine if a 
particular weapon would be the type which would foreseeably cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering.78
 
 The so-called “SIrUS” criteria would ban weapons when their 
use would result in: 
• A specific disease, specific abnormal physiological state, a specific and 
permanent disability or specific disfigurement; or 
• Field mortality of more than 25% or a hospital mortality of more than 5%; or 
• Grade 3 wounds as measured by the Red Cross wound classification scale; or 
• Effects for which there is no well-recognized and proven treatment.79
 
 
The operative term here is specific; the criteria speak to technology specifically 
designed to accomplish more than render an adversary hors de combat. This test for 
determining weapons exclusion is a medical test and does not take into consideration the 
issue of military necessity. For this reason, these SIrUS criteria have been roundly 
                                                                                                                                                              
the effect of armed conflict. Primary conventions include the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
supplemented by the Additional Protocols of 1977 relating to the protection of victims of armed 
conflicts; the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of armed 
Conflict and additional protocols; the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention; the 1980 
Conventional Weapons Conventions and its five protocols; the 1997 Ottawa Convention on anti-
personnel mines; and the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the involvement of children in armed conflict. International Committee of the Red Cross, What is 
International Humanitarian Law? (2004), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl (last visited Nov. 25, 2009). 
77  See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its 
Annex: Regulation Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 
2227, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4374cae64.html (last visited Oct. 9, 
2010). 
78  D. Holdstock, International Committee of the Red Cross: the medical profession and the 
effects of weapons, 12 Medicine, Conflict and Survival 254 (1996). 
79  International Committee of the Red Cross, The SIrUS Project: Towards a Determination 
of Which Weapons Cause “Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering” (1997), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/SIrUS-project.pdf.  See also Andrew Kock, Should 
War be Hell?, Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 10, 2000, at 23. 
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criticized and rejected by the United States specifically, and by the international 
community generally, notwithstanding support for the general principle against the use of 
inhumane weapons.80
The second principle, military necessity, requires a different analysis. This 
principle “…justifies measures of regulated force not forbidden by international law 
which are indispensable for securing the prompt submission of the enemy, with the least 
possible expenditures of economic and human resources.”
 
81
The third principle, proportionality, is of considerable concern to the developer 
and user of new technologies. A use of a particular technology is not proportional if the 
loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks is excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.
  Military necessity 
recognizes the benefit to friend and foe alike of a speedy end to hostilities.  Protracted 
warfare, it assumes, creates more rather than less suffering for all sides. In order to 
determine the necessity for the use of a particular technology, then, one needs to know 
what the definition of victory is, and how to measure the submission of the enemy in 
order to determine whether the technology will be necessary in this regard.  
82
Discrimination, the fourth principle, goes to the heart of moral judgment. 
Indiscriminate attacks (uses) are prohibited under the rules. Indiscriminate uses occur 
whenever such uses are not directed against a specific military objective, or otherwise 
employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be directed at a 
specified military target (indiscriminate bombing of cities for example).  Indiscriminate 
usage also encompasses any method or means of combat, the effects of which cannot be 
limited as required, or that are otherwise of a nature to strike military and civilian targets 
without distinction. 
 In order to make this 
determination, it can be argued, one must consider the military necessity of a particular 
use and evaluate the benefits of that use in furtherance of a specific objective against the 
collateral damage that may be caused.  
A final principle is command responsibility, that principle which exposes a 
multiple of superiors to various forms of liability for failure to act in the face of 
foreseeable illegal activities. This is a time-honored principle, grounded on the contract 
between soldiers and their superiors, which requires soldiers to act and superiors to 
determine when and how to act. It has a long history reflective of the need for control on 
                                                     
80  See Donna Marie Verchio, Just Say No! The SIrUS Project: Well-intentioned, but 
Unnecessary and Superfluous, 51 A.F. L. Rev. 183 (2001). 
81   See Roy Gutman & Daoud Kuttab, Indiscriminant Attack, in Crimes of War, the Book, 
What the Public Should Know (2007), available at 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/indiscriminate-attack.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2010). 
“Military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use 
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.” 
82 Headquarters, Department. of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of 
Land Warfare, change 1, para. 41  (1976), available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/27-10/CHANGE1.htm (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2010). 
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the battlefield.83
 A 1997 Protocol to the Geneva Convention requires that each State Party 
“determine whether the employment of any new weapon, means or method of warfare 
that it studies, develops, acquires or adopts would, in some or all circumstance, be 
prohibited by international law.”
 
84  The legal framework for this review is the 
international law applicable to the State, including international humanitarian law 
(“IHL”). In particular this consists of the treaty and customary prohibitions and 
restrictions on specific weapons, as well as the general IHL rules applicable to all 
weapons, means and methods of warfare. General rules include the principles described 
above, such as protecting civilians from the indiscriminate effects of weapons and 
combatants from unnecessary suffering. The assessment of a weapon in light of the 
relevant rules will require an examination of all relevant empirical information pertinent 
to the weapon, such as its technical description and actual performance, and its effects on 
health and the environment. This is the rationale for the involvement of experts of various 
disciplines in the review process.85
Once again, the United States is not a signatory to this Protocol and thus, 
technically not bound by its requirements.  Nonetheless, to the extent that it sets out 
reasonable requirements and methodologies for use by states fielding new and emerging 
technologies, however, this treaty could well set the standard in international law for 
what may be considered appropriate conduct. A final constraint worth noting is the 
emerging trend in international law to hold those responsible for fielding weapons which 
allegedly contravene the principles enunciated above through the use of litigation based 
on the concept of universal jurisdiction.
 
86
                                                     
83  See generally Brandy Womack, The Development and Recent Applications of the 
Doctrine of Command Responsibility: With Particular Reference to the Mens Rea Requirement, 
in,International Crime and Punishment: Selected Issues, Volume I 117 (Yee Sienho ed., 2003). 
 While litigation to date has revolved primarily 
84  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 36, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/470?opendocument. 
85  Kathleen Lewand, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods 
of Warfare, Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, International 
Committee of the Red Cross (2006), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0902.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
86  The concept of universal jurisdiction is a customary international law norm that permits 
states to regulate certain conduct to which they have no discernable nexus. Generally, it is 
recognized as a principle of international law that all states have the right to regulate certain 
conduct regardless of the location of the offense or the nationalities of the offender or the victims. 
Piracy, slave trade, war crimes and genocide are all generally accepted subjects of universal 
jurisdiction. Belgium, Germany and Spain have all entertained such prosecutions. The issue of 
lawfare is also of concern. Lawfare is a strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for 
traditional military means to achieve military objectives. Each operation conducted by the U.S. 
military results in new and expanding efforts by groups and countries to use lawfare to respond to 
military force. American military authorities are still grappling with many of these issues.  See 
Council on Foreign Relations, Transcript, Lawfare, The Latest in Asymmetries (2003), available 
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around allegations of practices such as genocide, torture, rendition, and illegal 
interrogation, there is no reason to believe that future prosecutions may be justified where 
decisions regarding illegal innovation, adaptation, and use of weapons systems are made. 
 These various principles and requirements of international humanitarian law and 
ethical rules of military conduct would clearly impose some limitations on the 
development and use of lethal autonomous robots.  However, given the ambiguous 
meaning and uncertain legal binding status of these principles, they are unlikely to 
adequately constrain and shape the development and use of LARs on their own.  
Additional oversight mechanisms may therefore be warranted, which are further explored 
in the subsequent section. 
V.  LEGALLY BINDING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS  
 A more formal and traditional approach for oversight of a new weapons category 
such as LARs would be some form of binding international arms control agreement.87   
Under existing international law, there is no specific prohibition on lethal autonomous 
robots.  In September 2009, robotics expert Noel Sharkey, physicist Jurgen Altmann, 
bioethicist Robert Sparrow, and philosopher Peter Asaro founded the International 
Committee for Robot Arms Control (“ICRAC”) to campaign for limiting lethal 
autonomous robots through an international agreement modeled on existing arms control 
agreements such as those restricting nuclear and biological weapons.88  ICRAC called for 
military robots to be barred from space and that all robotic systems should be prohibited 
from carrying nuclear weapons.89
                                                                                                                                                              
at http://www.cfr.org/national-security-and-defense/lawfare-latest-asymmetries/p5772 (last 
visited Dec. 10, 2009). 
   The ICRAC is a small group at this time and as of yet 
87  Sparrow, supra note 41, at 27-29.  
88  Nic Fleming, Campaign Asks for International Treaty to Limit War Robots, New 
Scientist, Sept. 30, 2009, available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn17887-campaign-
asks-for-international-treaty-to-limit-war-robots.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).  See also The 
Statement of the 2010 Expert Workshop, supra note 4 (statement from expert workshop organized 
by ICRAC calling for an arms control regime that would prohibit the further development, 
acquisition, deployment, and use of autonomous robot weapons). 
89  Id.  It is worth noting that there have long been discussions in other contexts of banning 
from space at least some weapons.  For example, the Obama Administration has expressed an 
intent to seek a ban on weapons that “interfere with military and commercial satellites.”  See, e.g., 
Frank Morring, Jr., White House Wants Space Weapons Ban, Aviation Week, Jan. 27, 2009, 
available at  
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/Spacewea
012709.xml&headline=White%20House%20Wants%20Space%20Weapons%20Ban (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2010).  In contrast, the National Space Policy issued by the Bush White House in 2006 
states in part that the “United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other 
restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space.”  See, e.g., Marc 
Kaufman, Bush Sets Defense As Space Priority, Wash. Post, Oct. 18, 2006, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/17/AR2006101701484.html 
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its campaign does not yet seem to have gained the momentum necessary to spark a new 
international legal regime.  However, there is precedent for a non-governmental 
organization, the International Committee to Ban Landmines, successfully leading the 
charge towards banning a weapons system.90
 While ICRAC’s work has raised the issue of limiting lethal autonomous robots 
through an international arms control agreement, the wisdom of such a course of action is 
far from clear.  Do explicit international legal restrictions on lethal autonomous robots 
make sense?  Are they feasible – both from a political and a technological perspective?  
Does the ICRAC’s specific proposal make sense?  The goal of this section is to make 
some preliminary points about what the options may be for international legal restrictions 
on lethal autonomous robots, if a policy choice is made to attempt to restrict them.  
    
International law contains a significant number and diversity of precedents for 
restricting specific weapons.  Existing legally binding arms control agreements and other 
instruments include a wide variety of different types of restrictions on targeted weapons, 
including prohibitions and limitations (restrictions that fall short of prohibition) on (i) 
acquisition, (ii) research and development, (iii) testing, (iv) deployment, (v) transfer or 
proliferation, and (vi) use. 
 These various types of prohibitions and limitations form a kind of menu from 
which the drafters of an international legal instrument addressing lethal autonomous 
robots – or other emerging warfighting technologies – could choose in accordance with 
their goals and the parameters of political support for such restrictions.  A similar menu 
could be created of the various types of monitoring, verification, dispute-resolution, and 
enforcement mechanisms that implement the prohibitions and limitations contained in 
existing international legal arms control instruments. 
 These prohibitions and limitations (as well as any accompanying 
monitoring/verification, dispute-resolution, and enforcement provisions) can be contained 
in any of a number of different types of international legal instruments.  They are 
typically contained in legally binding, multilateral agreements, including in multilateral 
agreements primarily focused on arms control and also in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.  However, there are also examples of prohibitions and 
limitations contained in legally binding, bilateral agreements, as well as examples of 
prohibitions and limitations contained in legally binding resolutions of the United 
Nations Security Council or in customary international law (which consists of rules of 
law derived from the consistent conduct of states acting out of the belief that the law 
required them to act that way).  As with the content of the restrictions and their 
implementing provisions, the choice of type of instrument depends on the drafters’ goals 
and the parameters of political support for the desired restrictions and implementing 
provisions. 
 New international legal arms control instruments are typically freestanding.  
However, there is also at least one existing multilateral legal framework agreement with 
respect to which it is worth exploring whether that agreement could usefully be amended 
to itself provide a vehicle for some or all desired restrictions on lethal autonomous robots.  
                                                                                                                                                              
(last visited Oct. 10, 2010).  
90  See, e.g., Raymond Bonner, How a Group of Outsiders Moved Nations to Ban Land 
Mines, N.Y. Times. Sept. 20, 1997, at A5. 
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This is the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have 
Indiscriminate Effects (the CCW),91 which has been ratified by over 100 state parties.92
 The operative provisions of the CCW are contained within its protocols.  The five 
protocols currently in force contain rules for the protection of military personnel and, 
particularly civilians and civilian objects from injury or attack under various conditions 
by means of: fragments that cannot readily be detected in the human body by x-rays 
(Protocol I), landmines and booby traps (amended Protocol II), incendiary weapons 
(Protocol III), blinding lasers (Protocol IV), and explosive remnants of war (Protocol 
V).
   
93  It is worth noting that the case that lethal autonomous robots should be restricted 
by the CCW could be made most effectively if it were argued that such robots are 
contrary to the “principle,” cited in the CCW preamble, “that prohibits the employment in 
armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature 
to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.”94
A. Menu of Types of Restrictions Contained in Current International Legal Arms 
Control Instruments 
 
 Some international legal arms control instruments prohibit a full range of 
activities involving the targeted weapons.  For example, State-parties to the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction, typically referred to as the “Mine Ban Treaty,” commit 
to not developing, producing, acquiring, retaining, stockpiling, or transferring anti-
personnel landmines.95
                                                     
91  Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), 
Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1523 (1980), available at 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/40BDE99D98467348C12571DE0060141
E/$file/CCW+text.pdf.  
  The following menu contains additional examples of existing 
international legal instruments which adopt the specified types of restrictions on a 
narrower basis: 
92  See, e.g., Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) At a Glance, available 
at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/CCW.  
93  Id. 
94  This argument would of course be contrary to the contentions of some robotics experts 
that lethal autonomous robots are particularly unlikely “to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering.” 
95  Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (1997). 
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1.  Prohibitions and Limitations on Acquisition 
 Several international legal arms control instruments completely prohibit the 
acquisition of targeted weapons.  For example, the Biological Weapons Convention 
(“BWC”) prohibits all state-parties from acquiring, producing, developing, stockpiling, or 
retaining – and requires all state-parties to within nine months destroy or divert to 
peaceful purposes – 1) biological agents and toxins “of types and in quantities that have 
no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes”; and 2) weapons, 
equipment and delivery vehicles “designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile 
weapons or in armed conflict.”96  The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 
(“CWC”) prohibits all state parties from producing or acquiring, as well as developing, 
stockpiling or retaining, chemical weapons.97
 In contrast, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“NPT”) 
creates two classes of states with regard to nuclear weapons.
 
98  Nuclear-weapon state-
parties are those that had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear 
explosive device prior to January 1, 1967 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States)99  The NPT does not require nuclear-weapon state-parties to give 
up their nuclear weapons, but does require those parties to “pursue negotiations in good 
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date 
and to nuclear disarmament.”100  Non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT are 
prohibited from receiving, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons.101




                                                     
96  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC), Apr. 10, 1972, 
26 UST 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, available at 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C4048678A93B6934C1257188004848D
0/$file/BWC-text-English.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).  
 provides a very different model, with a focus on transparency rather than 
97  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC), Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, available 
at http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).  
98  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), opened for signature July 1, 
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970), available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 
2010).  
99  Id. at Art. IX.   
100  Id. at Art. VI. 
101  Id. at Art. II. 
102  Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on Transparency in 
Conventional Weapons Acquisitions, June 7, 1999, available at 
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prohibition of acquisitions.  The Convention does not prohibit any acquisitions but does 
require its state-parties to annually report on their imports of certain specified heavy 
weapons, as well as submit notifications within 90 days of their incorporation of certain 
specified heavy weapons into their armed forces inventory, whether those weapons were 
imported or produced domestically.103
2.  Prohibitions and Limitations on Research and Development 
     
 Few, if any, international legal arms control instruments prohibit all research that 
could be useful for targeted weapons.  Limitations on development differ from instrument 
to instrument.  The CWC flatly prohibits the development of any chemical-weapon 
munition and device.104  In contrast, the BWC contains a more nuanced prohibition, 
banning the development, production, acquisition, and retention of 1) microbial or other 
biological agents or toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” and 2) weapons, equipment or means 
of delivery “designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed 
conflict.”105
3.  Prohibitions and Limitations on Testing 
  It is important to note that restrictions based on quantities or intended use 
rather than the underlying nature of the technology can be exceptionally difficult to 
verify, at least without highly intrusive inspections. 
 Prohibitions and limitations on testing of targeted weapons are most prominent in 
the nuclear-weapons context.  For example, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(“CTBT”), which has not yet entered into force, prohibits “any nuclear weapon test 
explosion or any other nuclear explosion.”106  The CTBT’s entry into force awaits 
ratification by nine key countries, including the United States.107
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-64.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).  
  In contrast, the 1963 
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under 
Water (also known as the “Limited Test Ban Treaty”) – which unlike the CTBT is in 
force – specifically prohibits nuclear-weapons tests “or any other nuclear explosion” only 
103  Id. at Art. III-IV. 
104  CWC, supra note 58, at Arts. I-II. 
105  BWC, supra note 57, at Art. I. 
106  Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 
1439 (1996), available at http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/treaty-text/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).  
107  Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, CTBTO 
Fact Sheet (2010), available at 
http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/public_information/CTBT_FactSheet_02_2010.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2010).  
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in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.108  The Limited Test Ban Treaty also 
prohibits nuclear explosions in all other environments, including underground, if they 
cause “radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under 
whose jurisdiction or control” the explosions were conducted.109
4.  Prohibitions and Limitations on Deployment 
 
 Some international legal arms control instruments focus on limiting deployment 
of the targeted weapons, such as with overall or regional, numerical caps.  For example, 
the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, entered into by the U.S. and Russia in 2002, 
requires the two countries to reduce their operationally deployed, strategic nuclear forces 
to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012.110  The Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, ratified by the United States in 1992, contains bloc and 
regional limits on deployment of certain weapons.111
5.  Prohibitions and Limitations on Transfer/Proliferation 
 
 Many international legal arms control instruments include prohibitions or 
limitations on transfer or other proliferation of the targeted weapons.  For example, the 
NPT prohibits parties that possess nuclear weapons from transferring the weapons to any 
recipient as well as from assisting, encouraging, or inducing any non-nuclear-weapon 
state to manufacture or otherwise acquire such weapons in any way.112
                                                     
108  Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under 
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, 14 U.S.T. 1313, available at 
http://disarmament.un.org/treatystatus.nsf/44e6eeabc9436b78852568770078d9c0/35ea6a019d9e0
58a852568770079dd94?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).  
 
109  Id. 
110  Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT), May 24, 2002, U.S.-Russ., 41 I.L.M. 
799 (2002), available at http://moscow.usembassy.gov/joint_05242002.html (last visited Oct. 10, 
2010).  See also Arms Control Association, The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) At 
a Glance, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/sort-glance (last visited Oct. 10, 
2010).  
111  Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Nov. 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1, 
available at http://www.dod.gov/acq/acic/treaties/cfe/index.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).  The 
Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, which has not been ratified by the United 
States, would replace the original treaty’s bloc and regional arms limits with national weapon 
ceilings.  See Arms Control Association, The Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
Treaty at a Glance, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/adaptcfe (last visited Oct. 
10, 2010).  
112  NPT, supra note 98, at Art. I. 
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 The CWC bans the direct or indirect transfer of chemical weapons.113  The CWC 
also bans assisting, encouraging, or inducing anyone to engage in CWC-prohibited 
activity.114  Similarly, the BWC bans the transfer to any recipient, directly or indirectly, 
and assisting any state, group of states, or international organizations to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire 1) biological agents and toxins “of types and in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” and 2) weapons, 
equipment and delivery vehicles “designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile 
weapons or in armed conflict.”115  In contrast, the Inter-American Convention on 
Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions does not prohibit exports but does 
require its state-parties to annually report on their exports of certain specified heavy 
weapons.116
6.  Prohibitions and Limitations on Use 
 
 Several international legal arms control instruments include prohibitions or 
limitations on use of the targeted weapons.  The International Court of Justice, in its 1996 
advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ruled that 
“the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law; However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the 
elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat 
or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of 
self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.”117  The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court prohibits 1) employing poison or poisoned 
weapons, 2) employing poisonous gases, and 3) employing bullets which flatten or 
expand easily in the human body.118  This list is potentially expandable.  While the CWC 
bans chemical weapons use or military preparation for use,119
                                                     
113  CWC, supra note 58, at Art. I. 
 the BWC does not ban the 
use of biological and toxin weapons but reaffirms the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which 
114  Id. 
115  BWC, supra note 57, at Art. III. 
116  Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions, 
supra note 102. 
117  International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. (July 8). 
118  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 
(1998). 
119  CWC, supra note 58. 
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prohibits such use.120
 Protocol IV of the CCW prohibits the use of lasers specifically designed to cause 
permanent blindness.
 
121  It further obliges state-parties to make every effort to avoid 
causing permanent blindness through the use of other lasers.122  While prohibiting the use 
of blinding lasers, the convention does not rule out their development or stockpiling.123  
However, it does outlaw any trade in such arms.124
B. Cautionary Note Regarding the Utility of International Legal Arms Control 
Instruments 
   
 It is worth noting that even the broadest and most aggressively implemented 
international legal arms control instruments suffer from certain inherent weaknesses.  For 
example, existing international legal arms control instruments only apply to states.  Their 
impact on non-state actors is at best indirect (for example, the CWC and BWC require 
state parties to prohibit activities on their territory that are prohibited directly for them).  
Yet non-state actors, particularly transnational terrorist groups, may present a significant 
threat of utilizing lethal autonomous robots.  In addition, these international legal arms 
control instruments typically require state consent – states can choose not to ratify these 
agreements and can withdraw from them if they do join.125
 
   
                                                     
120  BWC, supra note 57. 
121  Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons, annexed to Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 13, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1218 (1996). 
122  Id. at Art. 2. 
123  Id. at Art. 1. 
124  For details of how the ban came about, see Louise Doswald-Beck, New Protocol on 
Blinding Laser Weapons, 312 Int’l Rev. Red Cross (1996), available at  
http://www.icrc.ch/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JN4Y, and Christina Grisewood, Limits of 
Lasers, Mag. Int’l Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, available at 
http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine1996_2/18-19.html.   
125  Arms control prohibitions or restrictions imposed by legally binding United Nations 
Security Council (“UNSC”) resolutions, such as UNSCR 1540, differ from this model.  A 
resolution approved by the UNSC under its Chapter VII authorities is legally binding on all UN 
member states, whether or not they supported the resolution.  In addition, such a resolution 
typically cannot be rescinded or amended without the acquiescence of all five permanent 
members of the UNSC (China, France, Russia, UK, and U.S).  Customary international laws are 
another form of international law that can in some circumstances bind states without their 
approval and from which states are in some circumstances not permitted to withdraw. 
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VI.  SOFT LAW/GOVERNANCE APPROACHES 
 There have been a number of proposed strategies for managing the risks and 
regulating the uses of emerging military technologies.126  Those strategies vary in 
formality and scope.  Proposed measures range from formal, binding agreements such as 
treaties to informal initiatives such as codes of conduct.127
 In a growing number of areas of international oversight, ranging from 
environmental to commercial to social to military issues, traditional “hard law” treaties 
and agreements are being supplemented or in some cases displaced by new “soft law” 
approaches.
  Oversight of lethal 
autonomous robots is likely to lean towards the latter end of this spectrum at least 
initially.  Some form of coordinated international oversight is warranted, but at least in 
the short term, formal “hard law” treaties may not be practicable.  
128 “Soft law” approaches seek to create and implement substantive principles 
or norms without creating enforceable legal requirements.  The traditional model of 
binding international regulation that relies on formal treaties negotiated by government 
officials has a number of limitations, including the excessive resources and time needed 
to negotiate a formal international agreement, problems in enforcement of and 
compliance with such agreements, and the lack of flexibility and responsiveness in 
adapting such instruments to changing circumstances.129
  Many new models of international oversight or harmonization have been 
developed to circumvent such problems.  These new models tend to be more flexible and 
reflexive, capable of being launched relatively quickly and adapted easily to changing 
technological, political and security landscapes.  These new soft law approaches have 
their own limitations, including perhaps most importantly that they are not as binding and 
often not as specific as traditional legal agreements.  Yet, their growing popularity is due 
to advantages such as the relative ease by which they can be adopted and updated, and 




 Some of the key soft law/governance approaches that have been applied in other 
areas of emerging technologies that could conceivably be adapted to apply to the military 
 
                                                     
126 Comm. on Advances in Tech. and the Prevention of Their Application to Next 
Generation Biowarfare Threats Staff, Nat’l Research Council, An International Perspective on 
Advancing Technologies and Strategies for Managing Dual-Use Risks: Report of a Workshop 73-
74 (Nat’l Academies Press 2005). 
127 Id. 
128 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 
54 Int’l Org. 421, 434-50 (2000) (providing numerous examples of “soft law” approaches in 
international law); Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral 
Arms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 Chi. J. of Int’l L. 59, 63 (2003) (detailing the 
growing use of “soft law” in international arms control). 
129  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 128, at 423. 
130  Williamson, supra note 128, at 63. 
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use of robotics are briefly described below.   
A. Codes of Conduct 
 Codes of conduct are non-binding and often somewhat general guidelines 
defining responsible, ethical behavior and which are intended to promote a culture of 
responsibility.  They can be developed and implemented by a variety of different entities, 
including governmental agencies, industry groups, individual companies, professional or 
scientific societies, non-governmental organizations, or collaborative partnerships 
involving two or more of these entities.  
  One of the first, and possibly most successful, codes of conduct was developed at 
the outset of the field of genetic engineering. The Asilomar guidelines on recombinant 
DNA research were adopted in the 1970s in response to safety concerns about some early 
genetic engineering experiments.131  These guidelines were initially developed by 
scientists based on discussions at a 1975 conference held at the Asilomar Conference 
Center in Pacific Grove, California, and were subsequently adopted into more binding 
guidelines (at least for funding recipients) by the National Institutes of Health in 1976. 
The later guidelines have been widely complied with by scientists around the world.132
 More recently, codes of conduct have emerged at the forefront of discussions to 
restrict the use of genetic engineering to create new biological weapons.
   
133  Although 
there are concerns that unenforceable codes of conduct will not provide strong enough 
assurances against the creation of new genetically engineered biological weapons, they 
may play an important bridging role in providing some initial protection and governance 
until more formal legal instruments can be negotiated and implemented.134
 Codes of conduct are being created for other emerging technologies with potential 
military applications.  The areas of synthetic biology and nanotechnology are two 
examples.  In synthetic biology three different groups have recently proposed competing 
codes of conduct to manage security implications.
  In the same 
way, codes of conduct may play a similar transitional role in establishing agreed-upon 
principles for the military use of robots. 
135
                                                     
131  Paul Berg, Asilomar 1975: DNA Modification Secured, 455 Nature 290, 290 (2008). 
  The groups are the U.S. 
Government, the International Association Synthetic Biology (IASB), and the 
132  Id. at 290-91. 
133  Jeanne Guillemin, Can Scientific Codes of Conduct Deter Bioweapons? 07-06 MIT 
Center for International Studies Audit of the Conventional Wisdom (2007) at 1-2, available at 
http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_04_07_Guillemin.pdf. 
134  Id. at 3. 
135  See Markus Fischer & Stephen M. Maurer, Harminizing Biosecurity Oversight for Gene 
Synthesis, 28 Nature Biotechnology 20 (2010). 
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International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC).136
 A number of codes of conduct have also been created in the field of 
nanotechnology.  The first code was developed by the Foresight Institute in the form of 
“guidelines,” with a primary objective of discouraging the creation and deployment of 
autonomous replicating nanosystems.
  This proliferation of competing 
codes flags a key question about who has the authority and influence to promulgate 
effective codes of conduct that relevant parties will comply with. 
137  The Foresight Institute guidelines have since 
been updated six times,138 demonstrating the flexibility and adaptivity that is possible 
with codes of conduct which can be relatively easily updated (at least compared with a 
treaty or other more formal instrument). The current Foresight guidelines are extremely 
thorough and address issues and implications of nanotechnology in professional, industry, 
military, health, policy and other contexts.139  The guidelines are based on the premise 
that professional ethics and soft law measures can be at least as effective as hard law in 
promoting safe practices.140  The drafters of the Foresight guidelines also recognize the 
value in promoting the least restrictive legal alternative while developing good practices 
in areas of emerging technology.141
 The European Union recently adopted a code of conduct for nanotechnology 
researchers.
 
142  The code promotes a responsible and open approach to research 
conducted within a “safe, ethical and effective framework.”143  Regular monitoring and 
revision of the code will occur in order to keep the code current with advances in 
nanoscience and nanotechnology.144
 Another nanotechnology code of conduct originating in Europe, but with 
 
                                                     
136  Id. at 20. 
137  Neil Jacobstein, Foresight Institute, Foresight Guidelines for Responsible 
Nanotechnology Development, Draft Version 6: April, 2006, available at 
http://www.foresight.org/guidelines/ForesightGuidelinesV6.pdf, at 4. 
138  Id. at 14-15. 
139  Id. at 10-13. 
140  Id. at 7-8. 
141  Id. at 6. 
142 Commission Recommendation of 07/02/2008 on a Code of Conduct for Repsonsible 
Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies Research (July 2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/nanotechnology/pdf/nanocode-rec_pe0894c_en.pdf. 
143  Id. at 5. 
144  Id. at 6. 
Vol. XII The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2011  
309  
international applicability, is the Responsible NanoCode.145 The Responsible NanoCode 
is an example of a code of conduct developed as a result of significant collaboration and 
designed to reach a wide target audience. The creators are United Kingdom’s Royal 
Society, a nanotechnology industry trade group and a public interest organization.146 The 
code is for companies that handle nanomaterials and the specific objective of the code is 
to “establish a consensus of good practice in the research, production, retail and disposal 
of products using nanotechnologies.”147 The code was developed to be universally 
applicable; it was devised “to be adopted by organisations in any part of the world, under 
any regulatory regime.”148
 Much of the discourse concerning codes of conduct tends to refer to codes of 
conduct as a single concept with a singular meaning or interpretation.  But codes of 
conduct can exist on a continuum with respect to their objectives, specificity, audience, 
and expectations of compliance.  The goal of all codes is to affect behavior, but different 
types of codes seek to shape behavior in different ways.
 
149  There are actually three 
primary types of codes: ethics, conduct, and practice.150 Codes of ethics entail 
professionalism; codes of conduct espouse guidelines of appropriate behavior; codes of 
practice embody practices to be enforced.151
 The principal benefit of codes of conduct may not be the codes themselves, but 
rather the educational and cooperation-building effects of developing them.
  Many codes, commonly referred to as codes 
of conduct, may in reality be a combination of the three types of codes. 
152
                                                     
145  ResponsibleNanoCode, Information on the Responsible NanoCode Initiative (May 
2008), available at 
http://www.responsiblenanocode.org/documents/InformationonTheResponsibleNanoCode.pdf. 
  So, 
notwithstanding the ultimate utility and efficacy (or lack thereof) of a code, its production 
may itself have expressive value.  The discussion and collaboration required to develop a 
code raises awareness of relevant issues and prompts dialogue between relevant 
146  Id. at 7. 
147  Id. at 3. 
148  Id. at 3. 
149  Royal Society, The Roles of Codes of Conduct in Preventing the Misuse of Scientific 
Research,  Royal Society Policy Document 03/05 (June 2005) , available at 
http://royalsociety.org/The-roles-of-codes-of-conduct-in-preventing-the-misuse-of-scientific-
research-/, at 2. 
150  Brian Rappert, Towards a Life Sciences Code: Countering the Threats from Biological 
Weapons, in Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention 2004, at 3 (Briefing Paper 13, 2d 
Series., Dep’t of Peace Studies, Univ. of Bradford, 2004), available at 
www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/BP_13_2ndseries.pdf (last visited July 28, 2010). 
151  The Royal Society, supra note 149, at 2. 
152  Brian Rappert, Pacing Science and Technology with Codes of Conduct: Rethinking 
What Works (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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parties.153  For example, individuals, institutions and countries must be aware of their 
ethical obligations.154  Once a code is created it can help achieve that end by being a 
valuable educational tool.155
 Even though their tangible outcomes may be hard to identify, measure and 
quantify, codes of conduct possess unique features which make them attractive informal 
measures.  The multiple codes of conduct that exist in the synthetic biology and 
nanotechnology industries highlight some of the salient benefits and drawbacks of codes 
of conduct.  In terms of benefits, they can be created rather quickly compared to the time 
it would take to develop formal legal regulations.  Codes can be drafted by interested 
parties who are knowledgeable in the area, and can be customized to address unique 
properties of a technology.  On the other hand, one of the drawbacks of codes is their 
difficulty in application.  Because anyone can craft a code of conduct, when multiple 
codes are introduced into an area, it is unclear whose code takes precedent.  There is no 
hierarchical relationship amongst codes of conduct that would provide a clear sense of 
priority.  The strengths of codes of conduct and other soft law mechanisms (being 
voluntary, cooperative, flexible measures) comes at a price: they have no rank order; they 
are all on the same playing field.   
  It is critical that countries are aware of other countries’ 
intentions and limits when it comes to the use of autonomous robots, and so it is 
reasonable to expect that the exercise of attempting to develop a code of conduct 
addressing these issues could have both utility and educational benefits.  
 Despite sounding like a straightforward concept, it is not a simple process to 
create a code of conduct.  Drafting a comprehensive, appropriate and effective code 
requires thorough consideration of myriad issues, attention to detail, as well as a proper 
balancing of the policy interests of interested parties.156   While a code of conduct will 
not likely be sufficient to ensure the appropriate and ethical use of lethal autonomous 
military robots, the process of creating and disseminating such a code is undeniably a 
step forward and can be an important piece or at least starting point of an eventual treaty 
or agreement in this area.157
                                                     
153  Royal Society, supra note 149, at 1. 
  
154  Margaret A. Somerville & Ronald M. Atlas, Ethics: A Weapon to Counter Bioterrorism, 
Science, Mar. 25 2005, at 1881. 
155  Id. 
156  Rappert, supra note 152, at 3. 
157  As discussed above, the most notable attempt to institute a code of conduct for military 
robotics to date is a “Code of Ethics” for robots being proposed by the Republic of South Korea, 
although the terms of the Code have yet to be fleshed out, and the code will apparently address 
issues relating to robots beyond just the military context.  See supra note 68 and accompanying 
text. 
Vol. XII The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2011  
311  
B. Transgovernmental Dialogue 
 “Transgovernmental dialogue” refers to a growing number of informal and 
flexible arrangements under which governmental officials from different countries meet 
on a regular basis to discuss and coordinate polices.  These opportunities provide a forum 
to share information and ‘best practices,’ to seek to harmonize policies and oversight 
mechanisms, to coordinate enforcement practices, and to help anticipate, prevent and 
resolve inter-national disputes.158  Transgovernmental dialogue can greatly enhance 
cooperation and influence policy outcomes.  It achieves that end through collaborative 
mechanisms and countries’ shared desire to address a common problem or goal. These 
types of dialogues are beneficial to the nations involved and are becoming increasingly 
common in areas requiring international coordination, with national security issues being 
a prime example.159  They offer “a structure that is less threatening to democratic 
governance than private transnational action and less costly than inter-state negotiations, 
yet they can lay a firm foundation for harmonized national regulation and even, if 
appropriate, for international regulation.”160
 An example of a transgovernmental dialogue in the national security context is the 
Australia Group, an informal forum of officials from forty-one nations with a common 
interest in preventing proliferation of materials that could be used for chemical or 
biological weapons.
 
161  Arising out of the experiences of the Iraq/Iran war of the late 
1980s, the Australia Group was chiefly concerned with the use of chemical and biological 
weapons deployed in that conflict, but the Group has subsequently developed a list of 
dual use162 items that that each country agrees to control through national export 
regulations. Since member countries do not have any legally binding obligations, 
achieving the goals set forth by the Australia Group depends completely on the voluntary 
good-faith commitment of the individual countries to the Group's goals.163
                                                     
158  Kenneth W. Abbott, Douglas J. Sylvester & Gary E. Marchant, Transnational 
Regulation: Reality or Romanticism?, in International Handbook on Regulating 
Nanotechnologies (Graeme Hodge, Diana Bowman and Andrew Maynard eds., 2010).   
  The Group 
meets annually to discuss ways to prevent proliferation of chemical and biological agents 
through national export licensing policies and other measures. 
159  See Patryk Pawlak, From Hierarchy to Networks: Transatlantic Governance of 
Homeland Security, 1 Journal of Global Change and Governance 1, 3 (2007) (discussing the shift 
from hierarchical to transgovernmental governance networks over the past decade, the 
accompanying structural and cultural shifts and their impacts on national security). 
160  Abbott et al., supra note 158. 
161  The Australia Group, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 
2010). 
162  “Dual use” simply refers to technology-based research and products that can be applied 
to both military and civilian use. 
163 The Australia Group: An Introduction, The Australia Group,  
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/introduction.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). 
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 Another example of an existing transgovernmental institution is the International 
Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH), which brings together pharmaceutical regulators 
from the US, Europe, and Japan, along with pharmaceutical industry representatives from 
the same three jurisdictions, to coordinate pharmaceutical regulatory policy issues with a 
view to harmonization.164 In addition to increasing harmonization, another goal of the 
ICH is to reduce the need for duplication of testing products, an accomplishment which is 
intended to reduce delays in the development and distribution of new medicines around 
the world.165
 A third example is the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), an organization of 30 industrialized countries that has created two committees 
(the Working Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials (WPMN) and the Working Party on 
Nanotechnology (WPN)) to undertake a variety of informal harmonization activities.
 
166  
The objective of the WPN is to promote international co-operation that fosters the 
research, development, and responsible commercialization of nanotechnology.167  The 
WPN facilitates communication between governments which promotes discussion, 
awareness, and ideally a coordination of policy responses.168  Meanwhile, the WPMN is 
an international effort to analyze the environmental health and safety risks posed by 
nanotechnology.169  Another example from the nanotechnology realm is the International 
Dialogue on Responsible Research and Development of Nanotechnology, a forum that 
has brought together regulators from almost 50 nations every two years (2004, 2006, 
2008) to discuss nanotechnology regulation.170
 These various examples of transnational dialogue are effective in starting a 
discussion among policymakers from different nations, and are relatively easy and quick 
  The initial meeting of this forum was 
sponsored by an NGO (the Meridian Institute), but the national governments volunteered 
to sponsor subsequent meetings (Japan in 2006 and the EU in 2008). 
                                                     
164 Int’l Conference on Harmonization, Welcome to the Official Web Site for the ICH, 
available at http://www.ich.org/cache/compo/276-254-1.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
165  Id.  
166  OECD, Nanotechnologies at the OECD, in Sixth Session of the Intergovernmental 
Forum on Chemical Safety, Dakar, Senegal 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.who.int/ifcs/documents/standingcommittee/nano_oecd.doc (last visited July 29, 
2010). 
167  Id. at 7. 
168  Gary E. Marchant et al., International Harmonization of Regulation of Nanomedicine 3 
Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology 1, 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/selt/vol3/iss3/art6/ (last visited April 16, 2011). 
169  Id. at 7. 
170  Meridian Institute, Report on the International Dialogue on Responsible Research and 
Development of Nanotechnology (2004), available at 
http://cordis.europa.eu/nanotechnology/src/intldialogue.htm (last visited July 28, 2010). 
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to implement.  The only major requirement is a sponsoring organization or nation to 
convene the initial meeting.  While these dialogue initiatives do not usually create any 
binding international policies, they can be an important first step to more concrete policy 
measures in the future, and such a model may serve a useful function in starting dialogue 
amongst government policymakers on international policies for military robots. 
C. Information Sharing and Confidence-Building Measures 
 Various types of information sharing and other confidence building measures 
have been used to enhance stability, trust and security for a variety of problems, including 
in the military and national security contexts.  Information-sharing and confidence-
building measures (“CBMs”) can be either adopted unilaterally or coordinated or 
negotiated among several parties. The concept of CBMs arose in the sphere of 
international relations, and such measures are frequently used in international conflicts as 
the initial steps for reducing hostilities between enemies. In this international context, 
CBMs usually involve some mix of communication, constraint, transparency, or 
verification measures. Information sharing mechanisms are one type of CBM.  An 
example of a legally-implemented information sharing mechanism is the Biosafety 
Clearing-House, which was applied under the Cartagena Protocol to the U.N. Convention 
on Biodiversity, creating a web-based portal that provides a forum for nations to share 
information on scientific risk of biotechnology products, as well as regulatory, legal and 
ethical determinations from each nation.171
 One could envision a variety of potential CBDs for military LARs, consisting of 
either unilateral or multilateral initiatives.  For example, individual or groups of nations 
could commit to a limited moratorium on the deployment of such systems.  Nations could 
share information on technical issues with regard to LARs including issues relating to 
potential compliance and verification of any future international agreements.  Nations 
could even take relatively minor but helpful steps by holding an international conference 
to discuss LAR issues.  
 
D. Framework Convention 
 A final potential soft law mechanism, which is really more of a hybrid between 
soft law and the more formal international agreements discussed in the previous section, 
is a framework agreement or convention.  A framework convention at its most basic level 
creates a process and an institutional basis for gradually developing a more substantive 
international agreement.  It consists of an initial agreement to create the framework 
agreement, often with little or no substantive legal “teeth” originally, but that sets in 
place: an annual meeting of representatives of the participating nations, perhaps a small 
secretariat to manage the process, and provisions for negotiating and adopting more 
substantive protocols that member nations can then ratify on an individual basis.  For 
example, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer began as a rather 
                                                     
171  Convention on Biological Diversity, Biosafety Clearing-House, available at 
http://bch.cbd.int/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2010). 
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weak agreement, but was gradually strengthened by various additions and protocols over 
time such as the Montreal Protocol and its amendments. Other prominent examples of 
such agreements include the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco. 
 While the lack of substantive content at the outset may seem a weakness of such 
agreements, it has the benefit of thereby being non-threatening to states that may 
otherwise be reluctant to sign onto any international agreement because of major 
scientific and technological uncertainties, differences in perspective, or distrust of other 
participating states.  Once the nations agree to participate, the framework agreement can 
be a vehicle for greater convergence of positions and building of trust going forward, 
opening the door for more substantive commitments on an incremental basis. A 
framework agreement provides several potential benefits to states, including to:  
 
• acknowledge that a problem may exist, legitimating it as an international 
concern; 
• draw the attention of relevant experts, interest groups, and the public to the 
problem; 
• commit themselves to take, or at least consider, more substantive action if the 
problem proves to be sufficiently serious; and 
• demonstrate that they are taking the issue seriously.172
 
 
      In addition to these benefits, the framework agreement can sometimes involve more 
concrete steps such as the establishment of technical or scientific committees that can 
provide an important understanding and cooperation on such issues, and potentially the 
inclusion of reporting and other information-sharing mechanisms that can improve 
transparency.   All of these mechanisms and benefits would potentially be timely and 
useful for addressing LARs. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 Many years ago, David Collinridge recognized a fundamental tension in the 
governance of new technologies – prior to the development and deployment of the 
technology, not enough is known about its potential risks to warrant or guide any 
restrictions or limitations, whereas once the technology has been developed and 
deployed, it is often too late to undertake meaningful regulations because the commercial 
momentum behind the technology is now too strong and entrenched.173
                                                     
172  Abbott et al., supra note 158. 
  There is an 
opportunity to break this cycle with respect to lethal autonomous robotics.  Enough 
concern and information exists now to consider appropriate governance models in a 
timely and proactive manner; yet, the time to take action is short before the current 
window of opportunity to design a relevant governance or oversight system for LARs 
closes. 
173  See generally David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (1980). 
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 The need to take action on LARs is therefore urgent and timely.  This article has 
not tried to prescribe a specific action or form of oversight, but rather has sought to 
identify the range of possible governance mechanisms that can be brought to bear on this 
problem.  This can range from ethical principles implemented through modifications or 
refinements of national policies, to changes in the law of war and rules of engagement, to 
international treaties or agreements, or to a variety of other “soft law” governance 
mechanisms.  Of course, any governance approach need not be restricted to any one of 
these modes of oversight, but could involve a combination of approaches.  The critical 
point is that discussions on these options must proceed promptly, at both national and 
international levels, if we are to successfully manage the convergence of rapidly 
advancing robotics technology with military needs, incentives and temptations.  
 
